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2                                Abstract
This paper re-examines the relationship between government size and
output volatility from two perspectives. First, we use a wider international
data set of 91 countries over the period 1980-1999 and thus not only the
OECD data that have thus far been utilized. Second, we also allow for
time series aspect by using panel data estimations. We have two new
findings. First, the results from OECD countries about the negative
relationship between output volatility and government size cannot be
generalized to a wider international data set. Second, the relationship
between government size and output volatility seems to be non-linear.
More precisely, the negative effect of  government size on output volatility
is significantly negative only for countries with high and small public
sectors.
Keywords: automatic stabilizers, government size, output volatility.
JEL classification: E32, E62, H30.
31. Introduction
In terms of fiscal policy two, though related, separate issues have been
subject to debate and research. Fiscal policy as an automatic stabilizer, i.e. to
what extent the given structure of fiscal policy helps to stabilize business
cycles and the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy, i.e. the question of
how discretionary changes in fiscal policy instruments affect economic
behaviour. These potentially separate issues of fiscal policy raise a
fundamental question: Do we need discretionary fiscal policy or is it enough
to have automatic stabilizers? There are some theoretical controversies
associated with the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy. According to a
Keynesian view discretionary changes in fiscal policy are effective in terms of
aggregate demand effects, while according to the Ricardian equivalence
theorem e.g. expansionary fiscal policy is ineffective in terms of aggregate
demand, which would imply that in this case there is no need for automatic
stabilizers. Recently, it has been argued in the New Keynesian economics with
imperfect product markets that fluctuations in welfare are magnified by the
presence of taxes which lies at odds with the old Keynesian view (see Kleven
and Kreiner (2003)).  
Perotti (1999) has used data from a panel of 19 OECD countries over the
period 1965-1994 to provide evidence which supports the notion that initial
conditions  - like the initial level of debt - are an important determinant of
fiscal shocks. More precisely, Perotti found evidence according to which
expenditure shocks have Keynesian effects at low levels of debt and non-
Keynesian effects in the opposite circumstances, while the evidence on a
similar switch in the effects of tax shocks is less strong. This is clearly against
the Ricardian equivalence theorem. But it is quite difficult to empirical
separate between automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy (see e.g.
Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Blanchard (1993) about empirical research on
4discretionary fiscal policy). Therefore, it is useful to argue in favour of trying
to study the potential role of public sector size in terms of output volatility.
The resulting estimates represent a sort of combination of automatic
stabilizers sand discretionary fiscal policy.
In the macroeconomic literature the relationship between government size
and output volatility has been analysed both theoretically and empirically. In
the old Keynesian economics the attention was focused on automatic fiscal
stabilizers associated with income taxes, but these models are not based on
optimising behaviour. Christiano (1984) has provided a survey and further
research of automatic stabilizers in the partial equilibrium context of an
optimising consumer choice model. He shows among others that the more the
economic shocks are  perceived as being idiosyncratic, the more the income
tax will serve as an automatic stabilizer for insurance reasons (see  also
Barsky and Mankiw and Zeldes (1986) as well as Cohen and Follette (2000)
for a further theoretical analysis along similar lines). There are some attempts
to provide a theoretical analysis of automatic stabilizers in stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium models. Gali (1994) has studied the effects of government
size on output variability in the context of a RBC model in which government
size is parametrized by the income tax rate and the share of government
purchases in output. In his theoretical model income taxes are destabilizing
and for most specifications considered government purchases are stabilizing.
Empirically, the issue about the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers can
be approached in various ways. A straightforward way is proceed is to run
simulations with macroeconomic models. There are problems with this
approach like: i) there is a potential specification uncertainty and ii) models
exist only for a limited number of countries.  Since the effectiveness of
automatic stabilizers might be related to the relative size of government
sector one may develop a simpler test procedure by regressing output
volatility by the size of government the idea being that bigger governments –
probably with higher degree of tax progression  -  have more effective
automatic stabilizers and thereby smoothen business cycles to a higher extent.
5In terms of empirics there is currently quite a lot of evidence about the
negative relationship between government size and output volatility. Gali
(1994) has studied this issue by using data from 22 OECD countries over the
period  1960-1990. According to his simple cross-country regressions both
taxes and government purchases seem to be working as automatic stabilizers,
partly in contrast to his real business cycle model. The same finding have
shown to hold by Cohen and Follette (2000) by using time-series data from
the U.S. Macroeconomic models usually provide evidence of automatic
stabilizers, but they largely assume the answers by ruling out the so-called
Ricardian equivalence in their specification of the consumption function (see
the discussion e.g. in Blanchard (2000), who also argues from a normative
point of view that with respect to aggregate demand shocks, automatic
stabilizers stabilize and that is good but that with respect to aggregate supply
shocks automatic stabilizers also stabilize, but this is not good; they do not
allow for the adjustment of output that would be desirable in this case).
A problem with the approach used e.g. by Gali (1994) is that the
correlation between government size and output volatility may be subject to a
reverse causality leading to a bias in simple OLS regressions. It has been
suggested from a political economy point of view that more volatile countries
are expected to have bigger governments for stabilizing output. Rodrik (1998)
has argued and presented empirical evidence in favour of the view that the
more open the economies are the bigger is the size of their government,
ceteris paribus. His theoretical explanation emphasizes social insurance
against external risks. See also Alesina and Wacziag (1998) for a slightly
different theoretical explanation about the observed positive relationship
between trade openness and government size. Persson and Tabellini (2001)
have argued that in presidential regimes the size of government is smaller and
less responsive to income shocks than in parliamentary regimes. They have
provided empirical evidence in favour of this hypothesis.
Fatás and Mihov (2001a) have taken these omitted variables bias
possibilities of OLS regressions into account by using a data set for 20 OECD
6countries over the somewhat longer period 1960-1997 and using instruments
for government size. According to their IV estimation results government size
 has a negative effect on output volatility, and in fact a larger than in the case
of OLS regressions (see also Fatás and Mihov (2001b)). There is also
evidence according to which government size and automatic stabilizers are
positively correlated across countries (see e.g. Noord (2000)).
There are two potential problems in the current empirical literature
associated with the relationship between government size and output
volatility. First, studies have used only either time-series data from U.S. or
cross-country regressions from the OECD-countries data set. Second, in the
cross-country analyses the focus has been on the cross-country regressions,
where the time series aspect has been ignored. In many countries, however,
the relative size of government has changed dramatically from the 1960s to
the 1990s. Under these kinds of circumstances the average values may not be
representative, in particular, if the relationship between output volatility,
government size and automatic stabilizers is not linear.
In this paper we use a wider international data set from 91 countries over
the period 1980-1999 including OECD countries as well to re-examine the
relationship between government size and output volatility in order to see
whether the results obtained earlier with smaller data sets are robust.
Moreover, and importantly, we also use unbalanced panel data estimations to
check whether the results will change when we allow not only for cross-
country aspect but also the time series aspect of data.
 
We proceed as follows: In section 2 we present the specifications to be
estimated, characterize the data set and provide definitions for the variables to
be used in empirical estimations. Section 3 presents the cross-country and
panel data estimation results, while section 4 concludes.
2. The data and estimation methods
7As we mentioned earlier we carry out both cross-country and panel data
estimations. The data we use are collected from the World Bank’s World
 Development Indicators CD-ROM for 2000. The time series cover the period
1980-1999. The number of countries is 109, although the data for several of
those is somewhat deficient. Therefore, in the case of cross-section
estimations the maximum number of countries included into the regressions
was restricted to 91 and the values of the dependent and explanatory variables
in this case are sample averages for 1960-1999. Under the pooled times-series
cross-section data the maximum number of data points is 2068, but this the
panel data set is not balanced. Next we characterize the alternative dependent
and potential explanatory variables, which we use in empirical estimations.
The dependent variable in the cross-section data is the standard deviation
of output (GDP) growth rate for the sample period and it is denoted by SD(y).
In the pooled cross-section time-series data, there is no exact counterpart for
this variable. Therefore, two alternative proxies are used in what follows. The
first one is simply the squared output growth term. The second alternative is
the squared difference between actual output growth (y) and 10 year lagged
average of output growth y* rates. These two measured are denoted,
respectively, as (y)2 and (y-y*)2.
The potential explanatory variables are the following: First, the basic
variable is the government size, measured by three alternative ways: i) the
gross tax rate, i.e. all taxes and transfers from the private sector to the public
sector/GDP, denoted by TAX, ii) public consumption/GDP, denoted by public
cons. And iii) total public sector expenditure/GDP, denoted by public exp.
The potential problems with the basic regression between output volatility
and government size are the omitted variables bias and the endogeneity issue.
In other words, the results of this simple regression could only represent an
indirect link between output volatility and government size. We thus add
several variables to our baseline regression to control for these possibilities.
8In addition to government size variable, there are other potential
candidates for explanatory variables to account for output volatility like the
 living standard measured by GDP per capita, denoted by GDPpc, because
poorer economies might have more volatile business cycles (see e.g.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)) and the average output growth, denoted by
growth. Moreover, as has been argued along different lines from a political
economy point of view (see e.g. Rodrik (1998), Alesina and Wacziag (1998)
and Persson and Tabellini (2001)) the size of government might be
endogenous to economic conditions. If governments like to stabilize business
cycles, inherently more volatile economies might choose larger governments.
To the extent that volatility depends on the openness, there is a positive
relationship openness and volatility. In what follows the openness of
economies are measured by the export/GDP share, denoted by X.
Finally, sectoral specialization – captured by differences in sectoral shares
across countries and over time – might affect output volatility (see e.g.
Krugman (1991)). We have used three different measures to try to capture
this aspect: i) the GDP share of agriculture, denoted by AGRI, ii) the GDP
share of investment denoted INV and iii) the GDP share of military
expenditures, denoted by MIL. We also use two other additional controls: i)
the average life expectancy, denoted by LIFE and ii) the total population size
of the country, denoted by POP.
After having characterized the data and the variables to be used, we briefly
describe the estimation procedures in different cases. First, the cross-section
regressions are estimated both by using OLS and the Instrumental Variable
method (IV). The latter is used take account for possible endogeneity of the
government size in terms of output volatility, i.e. economies that display
higher volatility might choose larger governments to stabilize their business
cycles. We also provide some sensitive analysis by using various robust
estimators to explore whether the estimation results are sensitive to outlier
observations. Second, in the case of pooled cross-section time-series panel
data, both the (unweighted) OLS and GLS estimators are used. In the case of
9GLS, the data are weighted, conventionally, by the inverses of residual
variances. In the panel data estimations the specifications include country
 dummies to take into account the fixed effects. In the case of panel data we
allow for potential non-linearity of the relationship between government size
and volatility. Preliminary Hausmann-tests indicated that the fixed effects
specification is superior to the random effects specification, so that in what
follows we stick to this model (for comparisons and elaborations of these
different type of panel data specifications, see e.g Baltagi (1995)).1
3. Cross-Country and Panel Data Estimation Results
     In this section we present estimation results concerning the relationship
between output volatility and government size and proceed as follows: First
we report three sets of estimation results by focusing the cross-country
regressions and second, we allow for time series aspect of the data in the
panel estimation in order to check the robustness of results and potential non-
linearity of the relationship between volatility and government size.
 3.1.              Cross-country estimates
     Table 1 reports the OLS estimates about the relationship between output
volatility, measured by the standard deviation of the output growth rate, and
government size measured in three alternative ways and it also include the
GDP per capita and the growth rate of GDP as additional explanatory
variables. We have estimated the model over different set of countries
depending on the level of GDP.
The estimation results can be characterized as follows. First, there does not
seem to be a statistically significant relationship between output volatility and
government size for the whole set of countries. Moreover, the explanatory
                                                
1 The test results about the fixed and random effect specifications of the panel data model are
available from the authors upon request.
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power of the specification is very low. Eliminating countries with a low level
of GDP will change the findings by giving the significant negative
relationship between output volatility and government size, measured by the
gross tax rate. Second, the GDP per capita seems to relate negatively to
output volatility suggesting that poorer countries are more volatile, ceteris
Table 1: Estimates of a simple SD(y) equation
Constant Govsize GDPpc Growth R2/SEE Gov size GDPpc/n
1 5.373
(9.77)
-.042
(1.78)
.023
2.580
TAX y>0
91
2 5.649
(6.33)
-.073
(2.76)
.084
2.344
TAX y>5000
41
3 5.857
(4.77)
-.093
(2.51)
.244
1.630
TAX y>104
27
4 5.333
(7.26)
.024
(0.77)
-.017
(3.91)
-.041
(0.31)
.148
2.442
TAX y>0
91
5 8.340
(3.32)
-.080
(2.18)
-.017
(2.13)
.000
(0.00)
.361
1.559
TAX y>104
27
6 4.000
(4.56)
.134
(2.19)
-.020
(4.45)
-.053
(0.44)
.210
2.352
Public cons. y>0
91
7 7.305
(2.46)
-.050
(0.67)
-.020
(2.16)
.112
(0.58)
.219
1.724
Public cons. y>104
27
8 4.660
(6.28)
.042
(2.05)
-.018
.(4.95)
-.030
(0.23)
.182
2.41
Public exp. y>0
91
9 8.151
(2.25)
-.037
(0.81)
-.023
(2.13)
-.023
(0.49)
.246
1.691
Public exp. y>104
26
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of the output growth rate.
Heteroskedasticity adjusted White’s t ratios are inside parentheses. TAX denotes the
gross tax rate, public cons. public consumption/GDP. Public/exp public
expenditure/GDP, GDPpc Per Capita Gross Domestic in US dollars, and Growth the
growth rate of Gross Domestic Product.  The last column indicates how the sample is
defined. Thus, y>0, n=91 means that all 91 observations are included. The y>104
threshold roughly corresponds to difference between the OECD and the rest of the world
countries.
paribus, while the GDP growth rate is always statistically insignificant.
Finally, if government size is measured by using public consumption/GDP
ratio or public expenditure/GDP ratio, the results are mixed; for the whole
data there seems to be a positive relationship between output volatility and
government size while for the high-income (OECD) countries the relationship
is negative, but very weak and unprecise.
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Table 2 provides estimates using the same data set, but incorporating some
additional explanatory variables as potential controls like the share of export
to GDP, and sectoral specialization measures: i) the GDP share of agriculture,
ii) the GDP share of investment and iii) the GDP share of military
expenditures. It also includes two other additional controls: i) the average life
expectancy and ii) the total population size of the country.  The estimation
results – presented in Table 2 - can be characterized as follows:
Table 2: Estimates of an extended SD(y) equation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10
Const. 19.303
(4.29)
13.169
(2.20)
18.221
(4.95)
13.600
(2.07)
18.516
(4.82)
12.309
(1.72)
15.603
(6.28)
29.068
(4.41)
13.393
(1.92)
Govsize -.035
(0.72)
-.117
(2.27)
-.007
(0.33)
-.034
(1.17)
-.013
(0.65)
-.036
(1.41)
-.005
(0.30)
-.030
(1.41)
-.038
(1.69)
GDPpc -.003
(0.56)
-.008
(0.91)
-.004
(0.88)
-.004
(0.56)
-.005
(0.96)
-.005
(0.67)
Growth -.163
(1.05)
-.070
(0.34)
-.167
(1.01)
-.122
(0.57)
-.196
(1.08)
-.187
(0.92)
X -.006
(0.78)
-.010
(1.12)
-.006
(0.71)
-.003
(0.28)
-.005
(0.67)
-.001
(0.11)
POP -.428
(2.35)
-.502
(4.05)
-.396
(2.49)
-.412
(2.69)
-.422
(2.48)
-.425
(2.89)
-.407
(3.40)
-.572
(4.72)
-.363
(1.09)
INV .106
(2.32)
-.032
(0.38)
.107
(2.22)
.072
(0.80)
.113
(2.20)
.062
(0.67)
.080
(2.27)
.084
(1.43)
.037
(1.09)
LIF -.137
(2.77)
.015
(0.12)
-.132
(2.82)
-.051
(0.41)
-.128
(2.74)
-.024
(0.20)
-.107
(4.56)
-.241
(3.01)
-.062
(0.65)
MIL .207
(2.46)
.187
(6.07)
.180
(2.38)
.118
(2.23)
.202
(2.61)
.194
(5.79)
.181
(2.51)
.100
(2.89)
.111
(2.95)
AGRI -.023
(1.72)
-.047
(1.17)
-.022
(1.69)
.003
(0.07)
-.022
(1.62)
.011
(0.29)
R2/SEE .437
1.814
.769
.761
.435
1.819
.714
.847
.441
1.819
.714
.847
.391
1.845
.692
1.324
.678
.804
Gov
size
Public
cons.
Public
cons
TAX TAX Public
exp.
Public
exp.
TAX TAX TAX
GDPpc
N
y>0
89
y>104
26
y>0
89
y>104
26
y>0
88
y>104
26
y>0
89
y>5000
40
y>104
26
Notation is the same as in Table 1. Now, only X denotes exports/GDP, POP log(total
population), INV gross capital formation/GDP, LIFE means life expectancy, MIL
military expenditure/GDP and AGRI the employment share of agriculture. The models
appear to be “strictly” linear: thus e.g. the RESET F test for equation 7 in Table 2 turns
out to be 0.032 with marginal probability 0.968.
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First, allowing for additional controls will increase the explanatory power
of output volatility equation. In particular, the GDP shares of military
expenditures and investment as well as the total population of country seem
to have statistically significant effect both in the whole and smaller data sets.
The variables INV and MIL affect positively, while the variable POP
negatively the output volatility. Second, while the share of exports to GDP is
not statistically significant, it is negative. Finally, the government size
variable – for three alternative ways to measure - is now always negative and
its t-value becomes higher, when the whole dataset is restricted to OECD
sample. But in most cases it is not statistically significant.
     All the estimations presented thus far have been OLS estimates. But it has
been argued that there is a potential endogeneity problem between output
volatility and government size, because government size might for political
economy reasons be affected by the degree of volatility of economies. In
Table 3 we present IV estimation results for two data sets, for the whole one
and the OECD sample using the specification of equation (7) of Table 2.
 Table 3: IV estimates of equation  (7) in Table 2
7 7-1 7-2
Const. 15.603
(6.28)
15.907
(6.17)
13.604
(2.02)
TAX -.005
(0.30)
-.018
(0.74)
-.041
(2.17)
POP -.407
(3.40)
-.432
(3.33)
-.364
(4.30)
INV .080
(2.27)
.083
(2.27)
.034
(1.08)
LIFE -.107
(4.56)
-.102
(4.32)
-.062
(0.67)
MIL .181
(2.51)
.175
(2.45)
.107
(2.97)
R2/SEE .391
1.845
.392
1.849
.678
0.805
Estimator OLS IV IV
GDPpc
n
y>0
89
y>0
88
y>104
26
       The list of instruments includes public consumption,
 public expenditure and output growth.
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The results can be characterized as follows: First, like in the earlier
estimations, eliminating countries with a low level of GDP will increase the
explanatory power of the output volatility specification. Second, IV
estimations both with the whole and narrower data sets provide slightly
higher coefficients (and t-ratios) of the government size variable, measured
by the gross tax rate, than OLS estimations.  Still, the effect of the
government size variable remains rather marginal.
To conclude, according to our cross-country estimates the relationship
between output volatility and government size is not uniform, but seems to
depend on the data set. There is evidence – though not very strong – that this
relationship is negative for the OECD countries, but not for the wider
international data set of 91 countries, which we have also used. This might
suggest that the relationship between volatility and government size may not
be linear, but depend for instance on the relative size of government.2
Results may also be sensitive to some outlier observations. To examine
this possibility we used various robust estimators, most notably the Least
Median of Squares (LMS) regression. Basically, the results coincided with
those with OLS and IV estimator. Thus, e.g. with equation (1) in Table 1, the
coefficient of the Govzise variable, measured by the gross tax rate, TAX,
turned out be -.031 with the “t-ratio” 1.67. Accordingly, with equation (4) in
the same Table, the coefficient turned out to be -.002 (0.14). Finally, with
equation 1 in Table 2, the LMS regression estimate turned out to be .005
(0.23). These findings clearly suggest that outlier observations are not the
reason for the poor performance of the Govsize variable in the output
volatility regression. Rather, the opposite seems to be true so that if outliers
are "properly" taken into account, the predictive power of the TAX variable
diminishes even further.
                                                
2  For a theoretical analysis of the potential non-linear relationship between government size
and economic performance, see e.g. Barro (1990), who extends one strand of endogenous-
growth model to include tax-financed government services that affect production or utility.
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This conclusion lies in confirmity with closer scrutiny of some individual
extreme observations. So, if we take equation 1 in Table 1 and look at the
coefficient of the Govsize variable (measured by the Gross tax rate) we obtain
the following parameter estimates for different subset of the data (the
percentage number for the Govsize variable indicates which part of the data
are included), presented in Table 4.
Table 4 Sensitivity analysis with the basic equation
Data Coefficient t-ratio n
<10 % -.581 3.38 13
<20 % -.014 0.13 50
<30 % +.020 0.42 75
<40 % -.033 1.17 88
>10 % -.045 1.62 78
>20 % -.108 2.50 41
>30 % +.050 0.51 16
>40 % -2.713 9.30 3
The data column refers to data classified on the
basis of government size, measured by the
gross tax rate, and while column n denotes the
number of countries in various classifications.
Quite clearly, the parameter estimates with seemingly high t-values
represent the both extremes of the data where the number of data points is
very small. The strong negative relationship does not seem to represent the
main part of the data. To get more affirmative results it might be useful not
only look at the sample averages of the data - as we have done above - but
also utilise the time series aspects of the data. To this kind of analysis we do
indeed turn now.
 3.2. Panel data estimates
      In many countries the relative size of government has changed
dramatically from the 1960s to the 1990s so that the average values may not
15
be representative, in particular, if the relationship between output volatility,
government size and automatic stabilizers is not linear. Figure 1 describes the
development of the gross tax rate in some OECD countries from 1960s to
1999. One can see that with the exception of Iceland (Isl) the gross tax rates
have increased quite dramatically.
Figure 1 Comparison of Gross Tax rates for 1960 and 1999
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 In Table 5 we present panel data estimates by using the fixed effect
specifications. Preliminary Hausmann-tests indicated that the fixed effects
specification is superior to the random effects specification, so that in what
follows we stick to this model. The results can be briefly characterized as
follows: First, now for the whole set of countries including the time series
aspect of the data the government size variable – measured by the gross tax
rate – is statistically significant for OLS and GLS estimates, while its
significance is not always very high. Second, unlike in the cross section
estimates, the export/GDP share is statistically significant and positive along
the line of the hypothesis presented e.g. by Rodrik (1998). Finally, there is
some evidence about the non-linear relationship between output volatility and
government size. This can be seen from two last specifications in Table 5.
The threshold value of 30 % of the relative size of government seems to be
16
either statistically significant or close to it depending on how to measure
output volatility in the case of panel data.
Table 5: Estimates with panel data
(∆y)2   =  -1.025TAX + 6.898∆y + .025GDPpc + .482X   - .663Pop + ΣDj
                 (2.16)           (23.81)      (0.52)            (2.18)        (6.13)
R2 = .393, DW = 1.612, n = 2068, estimator OLS
 (∆y)2   =  -.330TAX + 5.823∆y - .035GDPpc + .275X   - .200POP + ΣDj
                 (2.72)           (47.88)      (0.49)            (4.07)        (5.12)
R2 = .393, DW = 1.612, n = 2068, estimator GLS
(∆y-∆y*)2   =  -.803TAX –1.548∆y + .003GDPpc + .433X   - .459POP + ΣDj
                    (2.29)            (6.90)      (0.10)            (2.57)        (5.37)
R2 = .223, DW = 1.752, n = 1938, estimator OLS
(∆y-∆y*)2   =  -.419TAX –1.700∆y - .009GDPpc + .125X   - .175Pop + ΣDj
                    (4.09)            (17.06)     (1.48)            (2.27)        (5.55)
R2 = .223, DW = 1.752, n = 1938, estimator GLS
(∆y-∆y*)2   =  -.405TAX - .457{TAX|TAX≥30} –1.587∆y + .001GDPpc +.424X   - .468POP + ΣDj
                    (1.01)           (1.95)                           (7.05)      (0.30)            (2.52)        (5.47)
R2 = .224, DW = 1.758, n = 1938, estimator OLS
(∆y-∆y*)2   =  -.199TAX - .162{TAX|TAX≥30} –1.711∆y + .001GDPpc +.118X   - .188POP + ΣDj
                    (1.81)           (2.75)                        (17.28)      (1.34)            (2.09)        (6.01)
R2 = .224, DW = 1.758, n = 1938, estimator GLS
ΣDj  indicates country dummies
The threshold value TAX=30 per cent is obtained by a (relatively rough) search procedure.
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Figure 2 Relationship between the Government size and output volatility
As we can see from Figure 2, that even though there is weak statistical
evidence in favour of it, the negative relationship between government size –
measured by the gross tax rate (TAX)  -  and output volatility – measured by
the standard deviation of GDP growth (SDGY) – is not very strong,  the say
the least.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper we have re-examined the relationship between government
size and output volatility from two perspectives. First, we have used a wider
international data set of 91 countries over the period 1980-1998  -  including
also OECD countries  -  than what has been done in the earlier literature to re-
examine the relationship between government size and output volatility in
order to see whether the results obtained earlier with smaller data sets are
robust. Second, we have also allowed for time series aspect by using panel
data estimations to check whether the results will change when we allow not
only for cross-country aspect but also the time series aspect of data.
According to our findings the negative relationship between output
volatility and government size cannot be generalized to a wider international
data set. Second, the relationship between government size and output
volatility may be non-linear. More precisely, the negative relationship
between output volatility and government size seems to apply both to high
public sector- and low public sector-countries. Clearly, this suggests that
more empirical analysis in this area is required with both alternative (wider)
data sets and estimation procedures. Moreover, and importantly, if the results
are robust, there is a need to provide theoretical explanation for the findings.
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